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Background 
Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence on 25 June 1991. That 
was the date of the "collective 
thanatos"' which led to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. As a 
result of German pressure, the 
European Community, followed by a 
number of other states, recognized the 
independence of the secessionist 
republics on 15 January 1992 and 
buried the second Y~goslavia.~ 
Although the Westernmedia have 
now shifted their attention to the 
former Soviet Union, where other 
similar and potentially even more 
dangerous ethnic conflicts are brewing, 
that is not because genuine peace has 
been established in former Yugoslavia. 
To the contrary: blood continues to 
flow among the civilian population 
and among military and paramilitary 
personnel. As I write, the war is 
spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and threatens to turn into a disaster of 
far wider scope than the war in Croatia. 
The conflict has already claimed 3,083 
civilian victims according to Croatian 
sources. The Yugoslav Army has 
confirmed about 1,279 dead soldiers. 
But it is reliably estimated that from 
10,000 to 30,000people have been killed 
in all and another 30,000 people are 
reported mi~s ing .~  
The estimated number of refugees 
ranges from 600,000 to over 1 milliona4 
This is the third mass migration of 
Yugoslavians since 1939. The first 
consisted of people fleeing persecution 
in the Second World War and the 
mainly involuntary internal migration 
and emigration of Yugoslavians in the 
immediate post-war period. The 
second mass population movement 
was a legal labour migration, mainly to 
various West European countries as 
part of the "guest worker" programme 
of the 1960s and 1970s. It was a unique 
case among the socialist countries. The 
present tragedy can only be compared 
to that of the Second World War; from 
an international perspective, the 
United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees (UNHCR) compares it in 
scope, scale of atrocities and 
consequences for the population, to the 
Cambodian civil war. 
In three ways, analyzing the 
refugees' situation contributes to our 
understanding of issues beyond the 
human tragedy of the people 
themselves. First, it demystifies the 
genesis of the Yugoslav conflict, which 
is often reduced to a matter "ethnic 
hatred." It shows that the separation of 
populations along ethnic lines, while 
favouredby the power elites of Croatia, 
Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
only intensifies existing problems or 
creates new ones. Second, it draws 
attention to a category of refugee for 
whom "political refugee" status does 
not apply and therefore underscores 
the need to grant these people more 
security and protection than they have 
so far enjoyed. Third, given the 
relatively small number of refugees 
who have fled abroad compared to the 
number who have sought refuge 
within the boundaries of former 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav case may also 
help de-dramatize the East I West 
invasion scenarios which predict 
disruptive mass movements caused by 
political and ethnic violence or 
ecological catastrophe in the countries 
aligned with the former Soviet empire. 
The Demographic Structure 
The 600,000 to 1 million displaced 
persons referred to above come from 
Croatia, whose total population is 4.7 
million (see Figure 1). Moreover, most 
of these people come from a relatively 
small area - the front line, which is now 
under the control of the Yugoslav 
Army and Serbian forces. This means 
that in the course of six months, an 
average of at least 100,000 people were 
forced to leave their homes each month. 
Vast areas have been devastated and 
depopulated. 
In general, the destinations of the 
refugees are the larger urban centres - 
notably the capitals of the republics, 
but also such regions as Vojvodina and 
Istria. About 300,000 refugees have 
sought shelter in safe areas of Croatia. 
Over 160,000 have fled to Serbia 
(including Vojvodina), around 100,000 
Table 1: Number of Displaced Persons by Region of Destination, 
Yugoslavia, 31 December 1991 and 10 February 1992 
31 Dec/91 10 Febl92 Percent Change 
Croatia 311,000 321,966 3.5 
Serbia proper 90,414 99,993 10.6 
Vojvodina 59,822 61,390 2.6 
Kosovo 1,169 1,519 29.9 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 100,000 92,094 -7.9 
Slovenia 23,000 16,000 -30.4 
Montenegro 7,000 7,450 6.4 
Macedonia 2,050 2,400 17.1 
Total 594,455 604,812 1.7 
Source: International Red Cross 
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to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 23,000 
to Slovenia. As Table 1 suggests, the 
most recent events - increasing 
tensions and hostilities over the future 
of the multiethnic republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina - have now 
established a reverse trend: refugees 
have been leaving Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at a rate of several 
thousand a day. In only one day, 29 
March 1992,6,000 refugees crossed the 
bridge connecting the Bosnian town of 
Bosanski Brod with the Croatian town 
of Slavonski Brod, transforming the 
latter, with its 55,000 inhabitants, into a 
large refugee campas 
Far fewer people have sought 
shelter abroad than in Yugoslavia 
itselfS6 That is because people know 
their chances of receiving political 
asylum are practically nil. In Germany, 
for example, only about one percent of 
Yugoslavian asylum seekers in 1991 
actually received asylum. In the fall of 
1991 most of the Yugoslavs who 
entered various European countries as 
tourists remained underground until 
the decision adopted by most of the 
Fig, 1 : Refugee Movements in Yugoslavia 
Sha lded area indicates 
the main rnnv~rn~nta nf 
displaced 
countries to'tolerate' their presence for 
the time being was made public. The 
recent Swiss decision to repatriate 
14,000 Yugoslavs "because their lives 
were no longer in danger," has been 
criticized by the UNHCR in Geneva. In 
Germany, the target country of most 
Yugoslav asylum-seekers and refugees 
not requestingasylum (estimates of the 
number of such people vary from 
50,000 to 150,000), the decision not to 
repatriate them was taken at a 
conference of Ministers of the Interior 
of the Llnder on 8 November 1991. The 
decision applies to refugees from 
Croatia and to deserters from the 
Yugoslav army. Refugees are granted 
financial aid whether they apply for 
asylum or not.' 
The main receiving countries are 
neighbouring Hungary and the 
countries where Yugoslavs previously 
went as migrant labourers. One may 
reasonably assume that newly arriving 
refugees in the latter countries are 
greeted by already-established 
friendship and kin networks. In France, 
visa requirements were imposed in 
1986 for Yugoslavs and that has 
deterred the inflow of refugees. 
Elsewhere in Western Europe, 
Yugoslavs, together with Romanians, 
rank first in number of asylum 
applicants. 
Among migrants within former 
Yugoslavia, women and children 
under fifteen years of age represent 
two-thirds of the refugee flowa8 (Men 
were either drafted into the military or 
are hiding and therefore do not appear 
in the official figures.) For an entire 
generation of former Yugoslavia's 
youth, this has had disastrous effects 
on their critically important period of 
childhood development. 
The war zone from which the 
refugees come was an ethnically mixed 
area for centuries (see Figure 1). 
Villages tend to be predominantly Serb 
or Croat, depending on the region. But 
in urban areas, Croats, Serbs, 
Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks and 
Hungarians lived as neighbours and 
intermarried. Thus, before the war, 
Vukovar had 40,000 inhabitants, 43 
percent of whom were Croats, 37 
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percent Serbs, 7.3 percent Yugoslavs, 
1.6 percent Hungarians and 3.5 percent 
other ethnic  origin^.^ 
In front-line towns such as 
Vukovar, Daruvar, Pakrac, Beli 
Manastir, Osijek and Petrinja, the 
proportion of "Yugoslavs" (people 
who refused to define themselves as 
Serbs, Croats, etc.) was increasing 
constantly until the 1981 census, when 
it was around 20 percent. The 
proportion of Yugoslavs fell to 15 
percent in 1991 due to nationalist 
propaganda and subsequent ethnic 
polarization. The war and the ensuing 
displacement of persons created 
further polarization and ethnic 
homogenization: Croats fled mainly to 
Croatia, Serbs to Serbia and to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Clearly, people who 
spoke one language, shared the same 
culture and intermarried could only be 
separated by such violent methods. 
Assuming that most of those who 
found shelter in Serbia, and at least half 
of those who found shelter in Bosnia- 
Herzegovnia, are Serbs, one arrives at a 
total of 200,000 to 250,000 Serbian 
internal refugees. Knowing that the 
number of Serbs in Croatia was around 
600,000 according to the 1991 census, 
this means that one-third of the total 
Serbian population of Croatia is in 
exile. This underestimates the actual 
number, however, because it takes into 
account only the official UNHCR 
figures. One would also have to include 
deserters from the military and 
paramilitary forces, refugees abroad 
and missing persons in order to arrive 
at a total figure. In any case, these huge 
numbers highlight the grotesqueness 
of the Yugoslav army and Serbian 
government assertion that "the Federal 
Army's intervention was meant to 
'protect' the civilian population of 
Croatia." In reality, the military 
intervention served only the purposes 
of Tudjman and Milosevic: it separated 
ethnic populations, especially where 
they were geographically and socially 
mixed and "purified" the newly- 
created ethnic states. 
Since people did not live in 
isolated, ethnically pure enclaves, the 
situation has been a disaster, in 
particular in binational families - and 
in some front-line towns fully half of all 
families were ethnically mixed. Among 
the many families who resisted 
separation along ethnic lines, the war 
produced thousands of stateless 
persons, with no place to go and no 
place to go back to. Wherever they 
reside, Serbia or Croatia, such people 
are now considered potential enemies, 
"traitors against the nation." One 
person from a mixed marriage whom I 
interviewed reported that: 
I have always been closer to my mother. 
1 felt Croatian, Catholic, I even went to 
church. But I have now repeatedly been 
told that 1 cannot stay in Croatia and 
keep myjob-not even witha singledrop 
of Serbian blood in my veins. The 
situation became unbearable, so I left for 
Belgrade where I thought 1 would be 
better accepted; but there 1 was an 
'Ustascha Croat. ' 
This person eventually applied for 
asylum in Germany. 
The fate of such refugees 
demonstrates the fallacy of ethnic 
solutions to the Yugoslavian problem. 
There are about three million 
Yugoslavs - one eighth of the whole 
population - who are unable to accept 
ethnic citizenship in place of their 
Yugoslav citizenship, either because 
they come from mixed marriages or 
because they have lived in different 
parts of Yugoslavia and have 
established close ties with people 
throughout the country.1° No solution 
is foreseen for these "leftover 
Yugoslavs," no one represents them in 
peace talks, there is no one to guarantee 
their human rights, which are 
constantly violated or under threat. 
Their situation brings to mind Hannah 
Arendt's statement that "one glance at 
the demographic map of Europe 
should be sufficient to show that the 
nation-state principle cannot be 
introduced into Eastern Europe."" In 
Yugoslavia, multi-ethnicity was a way 
of life. As one of the first expressions of 
their sovereignty, the nation- states that 
have emerged in its place have 
denaturalized people, stripping them 
of their citizenship: people born in 
Slovenia and Croatia have to apply and 
provide proof of their blood origin. 
Amidst all the nationalistic euphoria, 
non-nationalist expressions took much 
longer to get articulated. It was only in 
February 1992 that the Civil Resistance 
Movement was created by people from 
various parts of former Yugoslavia to 
protect the rights of people who come 
from ethnically mixed families and 
identify themselves as Yugoslavs. 
Motives for Flight 
Outbursts of hatred and violence did 
not cause the war, as has usually been 
assumed. Rather, hatred and violence 
are the war's by-products. The war 
revived memories of Second World 
War massacres. But that was after 
almost half a century of peaceful 
coexistence and the widespread 
disregard of nationality and religion. 
The use of Goebelsian propaganda in a 
steady, aggressive media war was 
necessary to disrupt that situation. 
Several surveys drive home the 
point. The most recent one was 
conducted in Serbia among 650 
refugees from Croatia, who originated 
in 52 ethnically heterogeneous 
communities. Two-thirds of the 
respondents came from minority 
groups in their communities. Some 86 
percent of them had ethnic origins that 
differed from those of their neighbours, 
while 96 percent had established 
friendships and 66 percent had family 
relations with members of other ethnic 
groups. Fully 60 percent denied the 
existence of national divisions or of 
national intolerance in their 
communities and 77 percent had not 
had personal conflicts with members 
of other ethnic groups. Only 5.5 percent 
gave evidence of a continuous 
atmosphere of ethnic division and 
intolerance. Only 1.2 percent were able 
to give evidence of personal conflicts 
with members of other ethnic groups 
and a mere 0.8 percent were able to give 
evidence of collective forms of such 
conflict. The situation described by 
these data started changing during the 
first free multiparty election campaign 
in Croatia in 1991. Relations with 
friends, neighbours and even family 
relations deteriorated. 
When asked about the reasons for 
their flight, most respondents replied 
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"fear." People who left their homes as 
early as the spring of 1991 more 
frequently mentioned direct attacks 
and ill treatment in general than those 
who left later. People who fled later 
expressed a more general fear for life as 
the war spread and indiscriminate 
artillery attacks escalated in 
frequency.12 
Return? 
Most of the refugees who took part in 
the survey - 61.3 percent - expressed 
the desire to return home. Only 9.4 
percent said they would not return and 
29.5 percent did not know. The greatest 
readiness to go home was shown by 
peasants, who also had the fewest 
escape options and were the first 
victims of criminal attacks and 
massacres by troops. 
The UNHCR is presently 
preparing a detailed plan for the 
repatriation of refugees to areas which 
will be under the control of the UN 
protection forces (UNPROFOR) and 
which are now occupied by the Federal 
Army and SerbianForces. It is assumed 
that the returning population will be 
the same as the population that fled. 
However, in many cases refugees 
either do not have anywhere to return 
to because their houses have been 
destroyed or they still do not know 
what shape their houses are in. Many 
have lost their families and need 
support to find new meaning in life. In 
addition, most refugees still fear for 
their safety if they return. The official 
and unofficial messages from their 
regions are crystal clear: refugees can 
expect to be arbitrarily branded as 
traitors or war criminals, to be victims 
of revenge by the extremist gangs and 
paramilitary formations which nobody 
has so far been eager to take to court for 
war crimes. It is therefore unlikely that 
the protection of basic human rights 
would be better guaranteed in the 
regions under UNPROFRO 
supervision. This situation prevents 
easy repatriation. 
On the other hand, refugees are 
also under increasing pressure in the 
places where they have found 
temporary shelter. Over 80 percent of 
all refugees are being taken care of by 
friends and relatives. The rest are in 
collective shelters. A $24 million aid 
package provided by UNHCR, 
UNICEF and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) targets 500,000 
Yugoslavs displaced in their own 
country by war and covers primarily 
food parcels, medical help, drugs and 
 logistic^.'^ Nonetheless, receiving 
families are decreasingly able to 
shoulder the rest of the burden, in 
particular in poorer parts of the country 
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 The 
new Serbian law on refugees 
contributes to their insecurity: 
according to its article 18, refugees can 
be stripped of their status and sent back 
"when the situation changes." This 
means that the Serbian government, 
which conducted an undeclared war in 
order to "protect the Serbian 
population outside Serbian borders," 
could decide to repatriate Serbs in the 
same way as Switzerland, claiming that 
there is no longer any danger to life in 
their areas of origin.15 
Deserters 
In October 1991, M. Milenkovic, a 
Yugoslav soldier from Serbia, 
committed suicide. He could not 
choose between becoming a "traitor" 
by abandoning the front line and 
killing his compatriots.16 In Serbia he 
became the symbol of the growing 
resistance to the war among potential 
draftees and civilians in general. 
Strong anti-war feelings were 
widespread even before the beginning 
of hostilities. According to one survey 
conducted 25-29 July 1991, only a small 
minority of people in most major cities 
claimed that war was "the best means 
of preserving state or national 
honour." Only 1 percent of 
respondents in Ljubljana, 4 percent in 
Belgrade and 10 percent in Zagreb 
thought that people should volunteer 
for the army if the local governments 
decided to start a war. 
By theend of 1991 it wasestimated 
that around 100,000 young men had 
fled to Western Europe in order to 
avoid being drafted by the Croatian 
National Guard and that about 150,000 
escaped mobilization by the Yugoslav 
Federal Army by crossing the borders. 
In Serbia some 10,000 cases of desertion 
or of failure to respond to mobilization 
are being prosecuted.17 In most cases, 
resistance to the war among recruits has 
been passive and silent, but there have 
also been cases involving the mass 
desertion of several hundreds or 
thousands of recruits, of public 
demonstrations and of spectacular acts 
like that of a soldier who drove his 
armoured car from the Slavonian front to 
the centre of Belgrade and parked it in 
protest in front of the Serbian Parliament. 
Although in principle deserters risk the 
death penalty, so far only a few soldiers 
have been punished by the military.l8 
As early as August 1991 pacifists 
in Belgrade publicly called for men to 
refuse mobilization and for soldiers to 
desert. Their statements ran counter to 
official war propaganda and to 
traditional warrior attitudes which are 
even now represented in public 
opinion and among parliamentarians: 
there were even proposals in the 
Serbian parliament for a bill that would 
forbid return to all those who left the 
country because of the war. This 
proposal did not win the necessary 
majority and was defeated. However, 
parliament also rejected the 
counterproposal: an amnesty bill that 
would guarantee safe return and no 
sanctions against deserters.lg 
Concluslon 
The "return of nations" in Eastern and 
Central Europe, the creation of new 
ethnically homogeneous nation-states, 
demands a very high price for its 
realization. Can the Yugoslav tragedy 
serve as a sufficient warning to others? 
Nationalism, the credo of the power 
elites in former Yugoslavia - the 
"supreme stage of communism" as 
Adam Michnik mockingly called it - has 
transformed into victims precisely those 
in whose name and for whose "benefit" 
the war has allegedly been fought: the 
civilian population. Thousands have 
died, thousands more have become 
invalids, hundreds of thousands are 
refugees in what used to be their own 
country. That is the tragic legacy of the 
latest war in the Balkans. s 
(Footnotes on page 8)  
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